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DO FISHERMEN HAVE DIFFERENT PREFERENCES?:  
INSIGHTS FROM AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY AND HOUSEHOLD DATA 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We combine an artefactual field experiments and household survey data to investigate 
whether involvement in a unique occupation such as fishery makes the fishermen exhibit 
different risk and time preferences than those in other occupations. Using a structural 
model approach, we integrate prospect theory and hyperbolic time discounting into a 
single framework to simultaneously estimate and correlate the parameters of both risk 
and time preferences with other demographic variables. The key finding is that fishermen 
are found to be less risk-averse and more patient than others.  
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 Introduction 
 
Fishery exhibits a distinguishable working environment from other professions. This 
difference may impact fishermen’ risk and time preferences which in turn affect their 
decision making behavior. For instance, it is widely agreed upon that fishermen’ risk 
preference is a major determinant in their response to various changes in fishing stock, 
market, and weather conditions (Mistiaen and Strand, 2000). Likewise, fishermen’ time 
preferences may influence their response to fishery management policy such as a 
conservation program since that program induces a trade-off between limiting fishing 
efforts today and receiving higher profits in the long run. Therefore, understanding 
fishermen’ risk and time preferences is a key aspect of modeling and analyzing 
fishermen’ decision making behavior.  
In this paper, using a combination of experimental study and household data, we 
investigate whether fishermen have different risk and time preferences than others. 
Specifically, we use artefactual field experiments1 (Harrison and List, 2004) to directly 
measure preferences of individuals regarding risk and time. The key finding is that 
fishermen are found to be less averse to risk and more patient than others. 
As Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2009) point out, few field experiments have 
linked wealth, demographic variables and business practices to measured preferences as 
doing so requires conducting careful experiments and collecting time-consuming survey 
responses. A unique feature of this study is our ability to choose villagers who were 
previously surveyed in the 2002 living standard survey in Vietnam (VNLSS 2002), 
                                                 
1 Readers interested in the detailed discussion on the taxonomy of field experiments may refer to Glenn and 
List (2004). For simplicity, hence after we use the term field experiment to refer to artefactual field 
experiment. 
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conduct experiments with those villagers, and link their responses to the earlier survey 
data.  Having previous survey responses in hand before the experiments were designed 
also enabled us to choose a sample of villages with a wide range of average incomes.  
Regarding external validity of the experimental results, using a widely used 
survey such as VNLSS 2002 also provides us with more reliable test than other studies. A 
few other studies also link field experiment and household survey data.  In these studies, 
the household surveys are usually conducted by the researchers themselves. The quality 
and generality of these surveys are not verified by other independent researchers. On the 
contrary, VNLSS 2002 is independently and jointly conducted by the World Bank and 
the General Statistical Office of Vietnam. Furthermore, VNLSS 2002 is considered one 
of household surveys with highest quality in Vietnam as indicated by its presence in 
many studies on Vietnam. Therefore, we can be confident in integrating VNLSS 2002 
data into field experiment one as well as a reference point to test the external validity of 
the experimental results. 
  Another feature of our study is that using a structural model approach we 
incorporate risk and time preferences into a single framework of estimation. Most studies 
on risk and time preferences have typically focused individually on either risk 
preferences or time preferences. Fishery study is no exception. As will be discussed in the 
literature, there have been a great number of studies on fishermen’ risk and far fewer on 
time preferences. However, there is no study that integrates risk and time preferences into 
a single framework of analysis despite these two kinds of preferences being interwoven 
in the decision making process. One of the main objectives of this paper is to fill this gap 
in the literature. To achieve this objective we explicitly take into account risk preferences 
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when estimating the time preferences parameters for each individual including fishers. 
The standard approach to the estimation of time preferences parameters is to ask 
participants to make a series of choices between receiving x dollars today or y dollars for 
t days in the future. The time preferences parameters θ then are estimated based on the 
equation: x = φ(θ, t)y, where  φ(θ, t) is some time-discounting function. The shortcoming 
of this approach is that agents are actually interested in the utility received from having a 
certain amount of money rather than money itself. Thus, a more proper estimation 
equation would be U(x) = φ(θ, t)U(y). The conventional estimation equation x = φ(θ, t)y 
is true only if the agents are risk neutral.  As Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrom 
(2008) point out, assuming risk neutrality when estimating preferences parameters may 
underestimate the discount rates. 
Not only do we incorporate risk preferences into estimation of time preferences 
parameters, we also consider more general forms of both utility and time discounting 
functions than the standard approach. Specifically, we consider the agents’ utility 
function under prospect theory and their time preferences under the quasi hyperbolic 
discount function, allowing present biasedness to be an element.  These more general 
forms of risk and time preferences are increasingly agreed upon to be more useful in 
describing humans’ preferences than the standard expected utility and exponential time 
discounting functions. Anderson et al.  (2004), for instance, find that the average 
Vietnamese villagers exhibit present biasedness, which is absent in exponential time 
discounting.  Likewise, the loss aversion aspect of risk preferences in prospect theory 
utility is of great relevance to the fishery occupation in which receiving a negative profit 
for a fishing trip is not uncommon.   
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We organize the paper as follows: We first discuss relevant literature on 
fishermen’ risk and time preferences. Special attention is given to studies using 
experimental methods. We then give a brief introduction to Vietnam’s fishery. Next, we 
elaborate on the data and methodology used in this study. In this section, we also discuss 
the structural approach to estimate parameters of the utility function under prospect 
theory and quasi hyperbolic discounting models within a single framework. In the 
following section, we present the major findings and their interpretations. Finally, we 
conclude the paper and offer potential extensions of this research.  
 
1.  A Literature Review on Fishermen’ Risk and Time Preferences 
As mentioned, a typical feature of studies on fishermen’ risk and time preferences is that 
they focus on only one of the preferences. As such, we will first review studies on risk 
preferences with focus given to experimental study. We then proceed to reviewing 
literature on fishermen’ time preferences. 
 
Literatures on Fishermen’ risk preferences 
Sutinen’s (1979) paper is one of the early studies that specifically integrates the 
role of risk preference in fishing decision making behavior. In his study of remuneration 
practice in fishery, Sutinen assumes that fishermen exhibit risk-averse behavior, just like 
people in other occupations. Following Sutinen, it has been taken for relative granted that 
fishermen are risk-averse. Most empirical evidence on fishermen’ risk behavior seems to 
support the hypothesis that fishermen are risk-averse. For instance, using the Random 
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Parameter Logit (RPL) framework to study location choice in the North Atlantic fishery, 
Mistiaen and Strand (2000) find that 95% of fishermen are risk-averse.  
Only a few studies show results differing from Sutinen’s assumption that 
fishermen are risk-averse. For instance, Bockstael and Opaluch (1983) were the first to 
test risk preferences empirically. They tested the special case of CRRA, r=1, which is U= 
lnx, i.e., assuming risk aversion that they could not reject. Diane Dupont (1993) used a 
similar methodology and could reject risk aversion in 3 of 4 fisheries, but actually drew 
the incorrect inference that fishermen were risk preferring (see further Mistiaen and 
Strand, 2000). Eggert and Tveteras (2004), using revealed data, found that a substantial 
amount were not risk-averse. Also, McConnell and Price (2006) argue that risk neutrality 
is common among fishermen.    
Most of the studies mentioned above are based on the expected utility theory 
framework and use data from either surveys or logbooks. Instead of making initial 
assumptions or deriving general conclusions about risk behavior as the above studies did, 
we go a step further to directly measure the level of risk aversion. In other words, we are 
interested in parameterizing the level of risk aversion under the prospect theory 
framework using data from field experiment. The benefit of field experiment as Falk and 
Fehr (2003) point out is that it enables the researchers to generate truly exogenous 
variation in the data that would otherwise be unavailable in natural or empirical data. 
Further, random assignment of participants by hand-picking may help in reducing 
selection bias and problems with omitted variables.  
One of the first experimental studies on fishermen’ risk behavior is likely that by 
Eggert and Martinsson (2004). In Eggert and Martinsson’s study, risk preferences of 
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Swedish commercial fishermen are estimated by using data from a choice experiment, or 
more specifically, from a stated preference experiment. There is some difference between 
the lab experiment and the stated experiment. Stated preference methods are the broad 
class of hypothetical data collection methods as opposed to revealed preference methods 
that include contingent valuation, rankings, con joint, choice experiments (sometimes 
called stated choice). The participants were asked to choose between pairs of fishing trips 
characterized by the mean and spread of net revenue. Risk is measured by the spread of 
net revenue and is assumed to follow a uniform distribution to make it easier for the 
experiment participants to make a choice (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002). To 
investigate a pattern of risk behavior, the authors apply a constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) utility function: U = -e-ry which is independent of the initial wealth level (y). The 
Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion parameter r is then estimated.  
Based on the sign of the estimated r, one can infer that the experiment subject is 
risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-preferred depending on whether r is positive, zero, or 
negative, respectively. Eggert and Martinsson find that 87% of the respondents in their 
study are not risk-neutral. Rabin (2000), on the other hand, points out that expected utility 
theory predicts that people will be virtually risk-neutral, not only over modest stakes but 
also over quite sizable and economically significant stakes. As such, we can infer that 
almost 90% of the experiment participants do not behave according to expected utility 
theory. Eggert and Martinsson also find that 48% of the fishermen can be broadly 
characterized as risk-neutral and risk-preferred, 26% as modestly risk-averse, while 26% 
are strongly risk-averse.   
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As Eggert and Lokina (2007) point out, while there is a growing interest in 
studying fishermen’ risk preference, most studies involve commercial fisheries. To check 
the robustness of the results, Eggert and Lokina (2007), following a similar approach, 
investigate the risk preferences of artisanal fishermen in Tanzania. They find that about 
53% of Tanzanian fishermen can be broadly considered as risk-loving or risk-neutral, 
25% as modestly risk-averse and about 22% as strongly risk-averse. About 19% of 
fishermen in their sample behave as expected return maximizers. According to Lokina, 
this finding shows a marked difference from those in other commercial fisheries in which 
most fishermen are risk-averse. 
The studies by Eggert and Martinsson (2004) and Eggert and Lokina (2007) point 
out that expected utility theory may be appropriate in describing risk behavior regarding 
long-term decisions or decisions involving a large amount of money, such as purchasing 
a new boat in which lifetime wealth is properly taken into account. However, most 
decisions in the fishery are made in view of immediate horizons. More importantly, as 
noted by Eggert and Martinsson (2004), loss aversion may explain why only a small 
proportion of the fishermen in their study are risk-averse. This aspect of loss aversion, 
however, is missing under the expected utility theory framework. Accordingly, it is worth 
exploring fishermen’ risk behavior from an alternative model that incorporates broader 
aspects of risk behavior (Nguyen, 2008). 
  
Literatures on fishermen’ time preferences 
While the literature on fishermen’ risk preferences has been blossoming for sometime, 
studies on fishermen’ time preferences are relatively few.  Most of these studies address 
 10
time preferences in relation to fishery management. For instance, Asche (2001) finds that 
in fishery where the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) is underway, the personal fisher 
discount rates are initially high before they start decreasing. Amegashie and Sumalai 
(2008) consider discount to be endogenously determined. Specifically, they argue that an 
increase in fishing effort today will lead to 1.) a decrease in fish stock in the future and 
2.)  a decrease in discount factor as a result of depreciating future investment payoffs. In 
their Yellow Stone Lake integrated economics and ecosystem model, Settle and Shogren 
(2004) find that, compared to constant discount, hyperbolic discounting can lead to 
greater present differences between the value of a resource with and without human 
intervention. Put differently, a human intervention program such as the policy to protect 
native cutthroat trout from exotic lake trout in Yellowstone Lake is more likely to be 
justified under hyperbolic discounting. 
 It is worth noting that all of the above studies discuss potential impact of time 
preferences on fishery management outcome. However, no study has directly investigated 
whether fishermen’ time preferences behave according to exponential or hyperbolic 
discounting. Our study is the first to address this question.                
 
2.  A Brief Introduction to Vietnam’s Fishery and Fishermen 
Endowed with long coastlines and many rivers, Vietnam has a great potential for fishery 
development. “Com and Ca”, which can be translated into English as “Rice and Fish”, 
has been an important element of food consumption among Vietnamese for many 
centuries. According to recent statistics, the per capita annual consumption of fishery 
product was 13 kg in 2001 (VASEP, 2001). Fishery can be classified into two main 
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branches: freshwater and ocean fishing. The former includes fishing in the rivers, lakes, 
and ponds. According to Nguyen (2002), there are about 550,000 fishermen in Vietnam, 
of which, 450,000 are ocean fishermen and 100,000 are freshwater fishermen. Freshwater 
fishing, characterized by simple boats and rudimentary equipment, requires much less 
financing and capital to operate than ocean fishing, which generally employs more 
advanced and expensive boats. In addition to fishery, most fishermen are involved in 
farming or aquaculture activities to earn additional income for the families (Nguyen, 
2002). 
 
3. Data 
  
A noteworthy aspect of this study is the combination of experimental and household 
survey data. These two data are collected in two different contexts and for multiple 
purposes. The experimental data aims at understanding how agents make decision under 
a controlled environment while the household data observes how people make decisions 
in a real world context, and more precisely, the outcome of their decisions. We can ask if 
there is consistency in the participants’ behavior in these two different contexts (Harrison 
and List, 2004). One may argue that the subjects are less serious under experimental 
conditions compared to reality, especially when the subjects’ reward is relatively small. 
Fortunately, participants in our experiment can receive rewards of up to several days of 
salary for reasonably-made decisions2; hence, participants have strong incentive to take 
their decision making seriously (Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen, 2009). That said, we 
agree with Levitt and List (2007) in that human decisions are not only influenced by 
                                                 
2 The average experimental earning for three games was 174,141 dong (about 11 dollars), 
roughly 6 to 9 days’ wages for casual unskilled labor (Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen, 
2009). 
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monetary payoffs but also by other factors such as the process and context in which the 
decisions are made. Cross-situational consistency is still a matter of debate (Bouma, 
Bulte and Soest,  2008). 
The baseline information is compiled from the 2002 living standard survey 
(VNLSS 2002), which covers a total of 75,000 households in Vietnam. The survey 
provides key information on socioeconomic characteristics of Vietnamese households 
and individuals. The sample was designed in such a way that each household had the 
same probability of being selected. In the 2002 survey, 25 households were interviewed 
in each of the 142 and 137 rural villages in the Mekong Delta (in the South) and the Red 
River Delta (in the North, excluding villages in Hanoi City) respectively. Experiments 
were conducted in July and August of 2005 with the members of those households 
previously interviewed during the VNLSS 2002 survey3. In particular, we chose nine 
villages, five villages in the south and four villages in the north, with substantial 
differences in mean income, inequality, and market access to permit statistically 
significant cross-village comparisons.  We then combined the data using ID numbers of 
individuals who participated in both the experimental study and VNLHSS 2002 
household surveys as the linking variable.   
As highlighted in the introduction, by considering the agents’ risk preferences, we 
develop an empirical strategy that can improve upon the estimation of the time 
preferences parameters. To be able to do so we conducted two experiments addressing 
                                                 
3 Several households had moved during the period 2002-2005.  As such, we finally had 
184 participants in the experiments. Among these 184 participants, 3 participants didn’t 
show up at the experiment or decided not to participate; however, we use information on 
their household income level to calculate the village’s means income and some other 
summary statistics.   
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risk and time preferences respectively.   Detail of the experiments is reported in Tanaka, 
Camerer and Nguyen (2009). In what follows we summarize the most relevant points of 
these two experiments. 
 In the risk preference experiment, each participant was asked to choose between 
option A and option B under different scenarios. Each scenario is characterized by 
monetary rewards and the corresponding probabilities of receiving those rewards. After 
all participants in the experiment completed making decisions, a scenario was randomly 
selected to decide how much the participants would receive from the experiment. On 
average, the participant earned 21,431 VND which is equivalent to 1.3 USD.  
  To estimate the parameters of the utility function under prospect theory for each 
individual, we generate 35 scenarios. These scenarios are divided into three sub-
components. The first two sub-components aim at measuring the risk aversion and 
probability weighting function parameter. The third sub-component focuses on estimating 
the loss aversion parameter. 
Like Holt and Laury (2002), we present the difference in expected payoffs for 
each scenario in Table 1. There are 35 scenarios grouped into 3 series. Series 1 includes 
scenario 1 to scenario 14. Notice that the expected payoff for option A is the same for all 
scenarios whereas it increases for option B in correspondence with the scenario number 
increase. Thus, the expected payoff for scenario 6 and 7 are the same under option A 
while it is higher for scenario 7 under option B.  The same pattern is observed in series 2 
(scenario 14 to scenario 29) except that option B has a higher expected payoff than option 
A immediately beginning with the first question. Series 3 is the last batch (scenarios 29-
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35).  We notice the same pattern of expected payoffs as observed in series 1 and series 2; 
however, there is also a chance of losing money.  
As such, in each series, the scenarios are ordered in such a way that plan B 
improves compared to plan A.  To be consistent the individual will either choose plan A 
for all scenarios or switch to plan B in some scenarios and then choose B for all 
remaining scenarios in the series. Note also that we gave examples in the experimental 
instruction to illustrate to the participants that it was acceptable for them to choose option 
A in all scenarios of a given series (no switching); likewise they could make a switch 
directly in the first scenario of the series (choosing option A for every scenario in the 
series).  Table 2 presents the distribution of participants by the switching points in series 
1, 2 and 3. At any given point, there are always some participants who make the switch 
from A or B. Also, some people never make a switch in any given series. As such, we can 
trust the participants’ comprehension of the experimental instructions.   
The time preferences experiment is designed in such a way as to enable us to 
estimate not only the discount rate (δ), on which most other studies focus, but also the 
present biasedness parameter (β). There are 75 questions in the experiment. Each 
question takes the form: You are asked to choose between Option A: receiving x dong t 
days in the future or Option B: receiving y dong today.  These 75 questions are divided 
into 15 groups of five questions each. Like the risk experiment, to ensure that participants 
make consistent choices, for a given group, option A offers the same amount of money 
for every question whereas option B is ordered by the increasing amount of money 
awarded. Put differently, in each group option B improves as one moves to the next 
question. For each of the 15 groups, the participant is asked to choose a question that 
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marks a switch4 from option A to option B. After all participants have finished making 
choices, someone randomly picked a bingo ball to decide which question would be 
played for real payment. Also, we assigned and publicly announced in every experiment 
a trusted agent to deliver the money to those who chose to receive money in the future. 
This assignment aims at erasing any doubt of not receiving the money in the future if a 
participant chose to do this.  
             
4. Empirical Strategy: 
 
             
 Following Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrom (2008), we build upon the 
random utility model to develop an empirical strategy. In the experiment we ask the 
participant to choose between receiving x VND today (Option A) or y VND for t days in 
the future (Option B). U(x) is denoted to be the utility that the agent gains from having an 
amount of x VND and φ(t) as a time discounting function. His utility would be: 
i
A
i i
B
i
U U (x)                if he chose option A
U ( ; t)U (y)      if he chose option B 
=
= ϕ θ                                                                       (1) 
Only agent i knows  AiU  and
B
iU .  As researchers we don’t observe 
A
iU  and
B
iU ; 
rather we assume that i’s utility and time preferences take some functional forms. Also, 
we can observer i’s demographic characteristics. Thus, we can write: 
 
A A
i i i i
B B
i i i i i i
U PT (x;  Z )                        if he chose option A
U D ( ; t; Z )PT (x;  Z )       if he chose option B
= + ε
= θ + ε                                                 (2) 
 
                                                 
4 Participants are allowed to choose all option A or option B in a given group. We give examples in the 
instruction to illustrate such cases to participants. 
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where PT and D are the utility and discount functions that we assume agent i follows 
respectively. Zi is a vector of i’s demographic characteristics such as being a rosca 
member.  Aiε  and Biε  are the error terms. By standard conventions, Aiε  and Biε  are 
assumed to follow normal distribution and are identically and independently distributed.  
 
Next, we are going to specify the functional form for the utility PT and discount function 
D according to which agent i may likely behave. The better PT and D describe the true 
risk and time preferences of the agent, the smaller the error terms.  In this regard, our 
empirical model is more complete and comprehensive than other models in the time 
preferences literature in two aspects. First, by incorporating the utility function into the 
time discount model we take into account the risk preferences parameters into the 
estimation of the time preferences parameters. Most studies on time discounting 
implicitly assume that the agents are risk neutral (Andersen et al., 2008). Secondly, we 
allow both the utility function and discount function to take more general forms. As for 
risk preferences, we assume the participants behave according to prospect theory which 
incorporates other elements of risk time preferences such as loss aversion and probability 
weighting. The discount function takes into account the present biasedness of time 
preferences in addition to the standard discount factor.  As Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen 
(2009) point out, if standard models are an adequate approximation, then our richer 
instruments will deliver parameter values of the extra variables which affirm the virtue of 
the simpler models.  
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More specifically, as for the utility, we assume that the agents behave according 
to the cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and the one-parameter 
form of Drazen Prelec’s (1998) axiomatically-derived weighting function: 
 
v(y) w(p)(v(x) v(y)), x y 0 or x y 0
PT(x,p; y,q)
w(p)v(x) w(1 p)(v(y)) x 0 y
+ − > > < <⎧= ⎨ + − < <⎩                        (3) 
where 
x for x 0
v(x)
( x ) for x 0
α
α
⎧ >= ⎨−λ − <⎩
 
and w(p) exp[ ( ln p) ]γ= − −  
 
U(x, y;p)  is the expected prospect value over binary prospects consisting of the outcome 
(x, y) with the corresponding probability (p, 1-p). 
 
As for the discounting function, applying Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter’s (2007) model 
and using the same set of data,  Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2009) find that the quasi 
hyperbolic exponential discount function best fits the data. Applying this finding, we can 
formally write: 
 
 ( ; t) ( , ; t) exp( t)ϕ θ ≡ ϕ β δ = β −δ                                                                                          (4) 
 
where δ is the standard discount rate. 
  
 The observed choices made by each individual in the risk experiment allow us to 
estimate the utility according to (3) while observed choices in the time preference 
experiment enable us to estimate (4).  Recall that in the experiment we ask participants to 
choose option A or option B for each of the scenarios in both risk and time preferences 
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experiments. Considering participant i, let A; jiU  be the utility he receives from option A 
for scenario j.  Using (2), we can specifically write: 
  iA; j A; j A;j A; ji i iU PT (X ;  Z )= + ε                                                                                             (5) 
where A; jiPT  is the utility under prospect theory defined in (3) that agent i receives from 
option A for scenario j; Xi is a vector of i’s demographic characteristics such as age, 
education, etc.; A;jZ  is information on scenario j including probabilities and payoffs for 
option A and B; A; jiε  is the error term which captures either misspecification in the 
functional form of PT or unobserved characteristics of agent i. By standard convention 
we also assume that A; j A; j A; j1 2 N{ , ...... }ε ε ε  are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) 
and follow a normal distribution. We denote the joint density of this distribution as f (ε). 
 
Likewise, we can write the following expression if agent i chose option B: 
B; j B; j B;j B; j
i i i iU D( ; t;X )PT (X ;  Z )= θ + ε                                                                                (6) 
 
There are two important points worth noting before we move on. Firstly, there is no 
discounting function in equation (5) because in the time experiment section all option A’s 
give the opportunity of receiving the rewards today. Secondly, given that there is no time 
discounting in the risk experiment, equation (6) can be reduced to: 
B; j B; j B;j B; j
i i iU PT (X ;  Z )= + ε                                                                                              (6’) 
  Similarly, in the time preferences experiment given that all payoffs are positive 
and received with certainty, the utility under expected utility becomes the standard utility. 
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Thus, equation (3) can be simplified as: PT(x) xα= . This version of utility, in turn, 
greatly simplifies equation (3) and (4).  
  Given scenario j and using (3) & (4), the probability that option A is chosen can 
be expressed as:  
{ }
{ }
( )
A; j j A; j B; j B;j B; j
i i i i i i
A; j B; j B; j A; j
i i i i
A; j B; j
i i
x
Pr(A) Pr PT (X ;  Z ) D( ; t;X )PT (X ;  Z ) 0
Pr(A) Pr U U
Pr(A) U U
where (x) f ( )d  is the cummulative distribution of the error term 
= + ε − θ − ε ≥
∴ = − ≥ ε − ε
∴ = Φ −
Φ = ε ε ε∫
                     (7) 
Next, we define the latent index for option A given scenario j as follows: 
i
A; j A; j j B; j B;j
i i i iU (X ;  Z ) U (X ;  Z )Ι = − . Likewise, the latent index for option B is defined as: 
i
B; j B; j A; j
i iU UΙ = − .  We can then write Pr(A) = Ф( iA; jΙ ) and Pr(B) = Ф( iB; jΙ ).  
To apply the maximum log-likelihood estimation technique, we note that the 
conditional log-likelihood for each individual depends on the utility function parameters 
(α, λ, γ) under prospect theory (3) and the present biasedness parameter (β, δ) under the 
quasi hyperbolic exponential time discounting function (4) as well as the observed 
choices. More specifically, the conditional log likelihood for participant i can be 
expressed as: 
 
i i
110
i j j A;j j B;j j
i i i
j=1
lnl (α, λ, γ, β, δ;y ,X , Z )= {[lnφ(I )|y =1] + [lnφ(I )|y =0]}∑                                   (8) 
where jiy =1 when individual i chooses option A in scenario j and  
j
iy =0  when individual 
i chooses option B in scenario j; Xi is a vector of individual i’s characteristics.  
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To address the correlation between the parameters ( ,α λ , γ; β, δ) and demographic 
variables, we allow each of the parameters to be a linear function of the latter as follows: 
0 F F
0 F F
X X
X X + T
ψ = ψ + τ + τ + ξ
θ = θ + ϕ + ϕ + ν?                                                                                               (9) 
where ψ ≡ (α, λ, γ) and θ ≡  (β, δ);  
 XF is a binary variable indicating whether the individual is a fisher; 
 X is a vector of other socioeconomic and demographic variables including age, 
education, income, distance to market, involvement in trade, or work as a government 
official; T is a binary variable indicating whether the participant is the trusted agent in the 
trust experiment;  
ξ and υ are the error terms which are assumed to be i.i.d and uncorrelated: Cov(ξ, υ)=0.   
 
The joint likelihood for all individuals can then be written as: 
 i i
N N 110
i j j A; j j B; j j
i i
i 1 i 1 j=1
L( , ; y, Z) ln l ( , ; y , Z ) {[ln (I ) | y =1] + [ln (I ) | y =0]}
= =
ϕ θ = ϕ θ = φ φ∑ ∑∑           (10) 
where N is the number of participants in the experiment. 
 
The maximum likelihood estimation for ( , , ;  ,α λ γ β δ ) is therefore: 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^
( ,  ,  ; ,  ) arg max L( , , ,β, δ; y, Z)α λ γ β δ = α λ γ                                                                (11) 
We develop a maximum likelihood programming in Stata to estimate the 
correlation of the interested parameters with other socio economic variables based on 
(11). It is worth noting that we can derive (10) only under the assumption that the error 
terms for each individual are independent across scenarios.  A more realistic assumption 
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would be to allow for some correlation between these errors terms. If such were the case, 
a cross-sectional time series approach would be more appropriate (de Palma et al., 2008). 
Following this approach, the likelihood distribution for each individual would be: 
i i
N
A B
i i
i 1
{ (I ) | y =1 + (I ) | y =1}f( )d( )
=φ
φ φ φ φ∏∫  
where f(Ф) is the assumed joint distribution of the parameters to be estimated.  
One can then apply the simulated maximum likelihood technique (Train, 2003) to 
estimate the interested parameters. However, this approach requires a great deal of 
computational time5 in exchange for uncertain gain in efficiency. Instead, we apply the 
standard maximum likelihood procedure taking into account potential intracluster 
correlation6.  
   
5. Main Findings 
 
We first investigate the descriptive statistics of key variables used in the analysis. 
We classify the statistics according to the experimental site; S stands for the Southern 
sites whereas N stands for the Northern ones. As can be seen in Table 3, the majority of 
participants work in the farming sector. The mean year of schooling is around 7 years. 
This relatively high educational level is a crucial factor to ensure the participants’ 
comprehension of the experiments (Tanaka, Camerer, Nguyen 2009). It is worth noting 
that there exists a number of differences between the North’s and the South’s participants 
                                                 
5 For instance, Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrom (2008) in a complementary 
document to their paper in Econometrica mentioned that it may take 4 days to run the 
simulated maximum likelihood.   
6  We apply the cluster option in Stata which takes into account arbitrary intra-group 
correlation. 
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in several aspects. Southern participants are wealthier. The proportion of participants who 
work in the fishery is also greater in the South. On the other hand, there is a greater 
proportion of participants in the North working for the government. Given these 
differences between the North and South, we use a binary variable in the subsequent 
econometric models indicating whether the participant is in the South or North.  
Next, to check whether the participants are more likely to behave according to the 
prospect theory and quasi hyperbolic exponential discounting, we conduct hypothesis 
testing: Ho: (λ, γ, β) = (1, 1, 1) where λ, γ, β are the common estimated means of the 
corresponding parameters.  These estimated means are the constant coefficients found in 
Table 4 and Table 5.  All of the χ2 statistics are significant at the level of 1%; thus, the 
data are not likely to be supported by the standard expected utility and exponential 
discounting. 
The estimation results of the utility parameters (equation 1) are shown in Table 4. 
Each parameter is estimated separately. Taking into account the potential issue of 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), we use identical regressors in these estimation 
equations. Identical regressors ensure separate estimation receives the same efficiency as 
that by the generalized least squares (GLS) which produces efficient estimators (Greene, 
2003). We first look at the determinants of α, which is used as a proxy for risk aversion. 
A positive value of the coefficient implies that the corresponding variable has a negative 
impact on the risk aversion level, or the greater this variable is, the less risk-averse the 
participant is. The most interesting finding is that fishermen are found to be less risk-
averse than workers in other occupations (the base category). The specification test for 
the occupation coefficients also indicates that fishermen are less risk-averse than workers 
 23
in other job categories. This suggests that participants in occupations involving high risk 
might, over time, become more willing to take risks, though it is not necessary that 
fishermen are more risk loving than people in other occupations (Smith and Wilen, 
2005).  
Other factors that have a highly significant impact on the risk aversion level 
include education, and participation in a bidding Rotating Organization Savings and 
Credit Associations (roscas). Specifically, bidding roscas members are more risk-averse. 
This finding suggests roscas may act as insurance devices among the risk-averse 
population. Participants with higher levels of education are also found to be more averse 
to taking risk. This effect of education on risk aversion is consistent with that found in the 
study by Dohmen et al. (2005) but not in agreement with Yesuf and Bluffstone (2007) 
who find that literate Ethiopian farmers are less risk-averse than illiterate ones.  The 
effect of market distance on risk aversion, though significant only at 10%, is interesting. 
The closer the participant lives to the market, the less averse he or she is. It could be that 
living close to the market exposes the participant to the daily uncertainties of business 
activities, thereby acclimatizing the participant to income fluctuation.  
Extending our discussion to loss aversion, we find that being a fisher doesn’t 
make the participant significantly less averse to loss. The key factor influencing loss 
aversion is the mean village income. The richer the villagers are, the better they can 
jointly support their village fellows who are facing loss. Accordingly, the richer the 
village is, the less loss-averse the villagers are. This finding is of great relevance to 
community/village-oriented cultures in Vietnam where risk sharing among villagers is 
typical. People in the North are also significantly less loss-averse than those in the South, 
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which may be due to socio-historical reasons. Northerners have been under the socialist 
regime for a much longer period and have developed a stronger belief in the social safety 
network, which acts as a support net during times of loss.  
Next, we are going to address the correlation between time preferences and 
demographic variables. Table 5 presents the main estimation results. The key finding is 
that fishermen are found to have a significantly lower discount rate. Put differently, 
fishermen are found to be more patient than others. It is possible that constantly facing 
fishery regulations such as the stock recovery programs which require postponing earning 
profits today to earn higher ones in the future accustom fishermen to being more patient. 
There are other variables that have a significant effect on discount rates, although the 
effect is less significant. The older the participant is, the more patient he or she is. This 
result supports the hypothesis that people seems to be more patient as they get older 
(Anderson et al., 2004). Conventional wisdom holds that women tend to be more patient 
than men; interestingly, male participants in our study are found to be more patient than 
female participants. Rosca members are more patient than non-members. As expected, 
people living in richer communities are also more patient. This finding is consistent with 
that in Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen’s (2009) study. People with higher relative income, 
however, are found to be less patient. This finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
richer people are more patient than poorer ones. Members of bidding rosca, on the other 
hand, are less patient.   
As far as the correlation between present biasedness and demographic variables is 
concerned, the only variable which has a significant result at a level of 5% is being a 
bidding rosca member. Specifically, members of bidding roscas are found to be more 
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present biased. Members of rosca in general, however, are found to be less present 
biased. The result is significant at a level of 10%.      
 
 
Policy implications 
 
 
Several policy implications benefit from the finding that fishermen are less averse 
and more patient than others. First, fishery closure is a matter of debate among policy 
makers as they attempt to balance the fishermen’ economic well-being with the need for 
biological preservation. Fishery managers are concerned that fishermen would prefer less 
variation in revenue as a possible result from fishery closures, and they are also 
concerned with the resulting need for fishermen to relocate to other fishing grounds. The 
finding in this paper shows that fishermen are not so much afraid of income variation but 
rather of income loss. Thus, a more relevant question is how closures may lead to a 
reduction in fishing revenue, as fishermen are just as loss averse, in terms of revenue loss, 
as people of other occupations. Second, a number of programs that aim to help the poor 
in developing countries, such as the World Bank-initiated microfinance programs, 
assume fishermen are risk-averse, and therefore develop programs implementing risk 
sharing mechanisms to encourage more risky investment behavior. According to our 
finding, a more effective program would aim at developing a safety net to protect 
fishermen in the event of economic loss. 
In terms of time preferences, the findings that fishermen have lower discount 
rates—or equivalently, are more patient—offer important policy implications. Curtis 
(2002) notices that the stock recovery program would benefit significantly if fishermen 
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were more patient. This is because patient fishermen would be more willing to trade-off 
between fishing less today and receiving more profits in the future. The fishermen’ 
willingness to participate in turn reduces the operation cost of the program significantly. 
Likewise, patient fishermen are more likely to appreciate the ITQ systems which might 
take sometime to reap the full benefits. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 
We integrate prospect theory and the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model into a 
single framework to investigate whether working in fishery inclines fishermen to 
different risk and time preferences than others. The combination of experimental field 
data and household survey data plays an important role in the investigation process.        
  The key finding is that fishermen are found to be less averse to risk and more 
patient.  The insignificant effect of working in fishery on loss aversion implies that 
fishermen are afraid of loss of income as much as those in other professions. To articulate 
it differently, fishermen are less afraid of income variation than income loss. Likewise, 
fishermen are found to be as present biased as others.  
We discuss several policy implications given the above findings. It is worth 
noting that these policy implications hold true only under the condition that fishermen in 
real life exhibit the same risk and time preferences as observed in our experimental field 
study. A promising direction of doing research could be to investigate the external 
validity of the results we find here. For instance, we can study whether fishermen with 
lower estimated discount rates are more likely to participate in a voluntary conservation 
program. Such a study is complementary to ours.  
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  There remain areas for improvement relating to the causal relationship between 
involvement in fishery and risk and time preferences. The causality may go both 
directions. For instance, a number of studies in labor economics have shown that less 
risk-averse agents are more likely to choose riskier jobs for better compensation (Viscusi 
and Hersch, 2001). King (1974) finds that individuals from wealthier families choose 
riskier occupations; Cramer at al., (2002) show that less risk-averse agents are attracted to 
entrepreneurship which is a risky occupation. Thus, it could be that working in fishery 
makes people more accustomed to taking risks. But, it could also be the case that less 
risk-averse people would choose a risky occupation, such as fishery, to suit their 
preferences. Likewise, people with a certain type of time preferences may choose to work 
in fishery or the other way around. In the context of cross-sectional data like ours, it is 
not possible to solve all endogeneity problems. As such, we have been very cautious in 
discussing the main findings. These findings can be best viewed from a correlation 
perspective. The causal relationship between preferences and occupational choice is still 
an open question. It may be that fishery attracts people with a certain type of preferences. 
At the same time, we believe that preferences are both biologically and environmentally 
influenced. Working under such a special environment as fishery may affect fishermen’ 
risk and time preferences. To quote Strotz (1956):   “My own supposition is that most of 
us are ‘born’ with discount functions . . . [but that] true discount functions become 
sublimated by parental teaching and social pressure.” It is possible that being faced with 
constant fishery regulations which require postponing earning profits today for higher 
ones in the future accustom fishermen to be more patient. Likewise facing with 
uncertainty on an almost daily basis makes them less averse to risk. Future research can 
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more clearly establish the causal relationships between risk behavior and other variables 
by using panel data or randomized field experiments (Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen, 
2009).          
Finally, our study shows that new research methodologies can be applied to the 
study of economics. Estimation of risk and time preferences parameters can be integrated 
into a single framework. Field experiments and household data can be combined and can 
complement each other. The methodology developed in this study is applicable to a broad 
spectrum of research, both within fishery and in other fields as well.     
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Table 1. Expected Payoff Difference of Pairwise Lottery Choices 
Option A Option B 
Expected payoff
difference (A-B)
Series 1   
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 68,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 7,700
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 75,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 7,000
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 83,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 6,200
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 93,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 5,200
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 106,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 3,900
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 125,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 2,000
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 150,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 -500
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 185,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 -4,000
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 220,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 -7,500
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 300,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 -15,500
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 400,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 -25,500
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 600,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 -45,500
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 1,000,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 -85,500
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 1,700,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 -155,500
Series 2   
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 54,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -300
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 56,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -1,700
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 58,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -3,100
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 60,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -4,500
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 62,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -5,900
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 65,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -8,000
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 68,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -10,100
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 72,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -12,900
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 77,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -16,400
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 83,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -20,600
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 90,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -25,500
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 100,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -32,500
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 110,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -39,500
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 130,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 -53,500
Series 3   
              5/10 of 25,000 and 5/10 of -4,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of -21,000 6,000
5/10 of 4,000 and 5/10 of -4,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of -21,000 -4,500
5/10 of 1,000 and 5/10 of -4,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of -21,000 -6,000
5/10 of 1,000 and 5/10 of -4,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of -16,000 -8,500
5/10 of 1,000 and 5/10 of -8,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of -16,000 -10,500
5/10 of 1,000 and 5/10 of -8,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of -14,000 -11,500
 
              5/10 of 1,000 and 5/10 of -8,000      5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of -11,000 -13,000 
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Table 2: Number of subjects by switching points 
 
(1) Series 1 and 2  
 
 
Field  
experiments Switching point (question) in Series 1 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14Never Total 
Series 2      1 6  2 1 1 5 2 3 2 2 1  8 33
2   1 1 1 1 4
3   1 1 1 1 4
4   1 1 1 1 3 7
5   2 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 14
6   1 1 3 2 2 9
7 2 1 2 8 2 1 1 3 20
8   1 2 4 7 2 1 2 19
9   2 3 4 2 3 3 1 18
10   1 2 1 4
11   1 2 1 2 2 2 10
12   1 1 1 3 1 7
13   1 1 1 3
14   1 1 1 3
Never 1 1 3 2 5 1 3 2 11 29
Total 9 2 6 6 8 21 28 27 14 14 14 5 1 0 29 184
Bold italics indicates choices compatible with EU (α=1) and risk-aversion. 
 
(2) Series 3 
Switching point (question) in 
Series 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Never Total 
Student Subjects 8 15 7 7 9 2 0 7 55
Field Experiments 38 26 27 29 26 6 3 29 184
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Table 3: Basic descriptive statistics 
 
Experimental side  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 N1 N2 N3 N4 
Number of Subjects 
Total 22 16 18 22 22 18 22 24 20
Mean household income in 2002 (in 1 million dong) 
Total 36.6 35.8 20.3 18.5 15.0 28.0 17.5 9.1 6.8
Age (mean) 47.7 44.6 48.8 43.1 48.3 54.1 42.5 49.9 48.6
Gender (1=male) (mean) .59 .88 .83 .68 .82 .44 .36 .50 .50
Education (mean) (years) 7.2 7.1 8.4 5.8 5.0 7.8 8.0 4.8 7.6
Number of illiterate subjects 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 4 2
Acquaintance ratio (mean) .42 .86 .76 .74 .82 .62 .91 .98 .90
Main occupation of the subject (%) 
Farming 0 13 17 91 77 6 0 83 75
Livestock 5 19 56 50 32 6 45 54 10
Fishery 0 94 22 9 9 0 0 17 0
Trade 36 0 0 5 5 28 14 8 5
Business 23 0 17 0 5 6 14 8 10
Government officer 9 19 22 14 14 22 18 25 10
Casual work 27 0 11 5 14 0 5 17 10
Not working 23 0 17 0 9 50 9 8 15
No. of ROSCA contributors 14 44 17 64 41 39 55 83 35
Data from the 2002 Living Standard Measurement Survey (sample: 25 households) 
Village Gini coefficients .44 .19 .30 .36 .38 .29 .38 .28 .36
Distance to nearest market  .0 5.0 .0 4.2 .0 .0 1.0 3.0 .3
Number of households receiving remittance from overseas 
 7 2 1 1 0 5 2 0 0
Daily wage for male labor for harvesting (1000 dong) 
 - - 30 30 30 18 18 20 20
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36
Table 4: Correlation between risk preferences parameters and demographic 
variables under Prospect Theory 
    γ(Weighting function)     α (Value function)   λ  (Loss aversion)
Age -.002   -.003* .035 
Gender (1=male) -.125**  -.004  -.607  
Education .002   -.021*** .163  
Farm/livestock -.029   .004  -1.005  
Fishery .051   .244*** -.205  
Trade -.003   -.010  1.294  
Business .010   -.032  -.170  
Government officer .010   .082  -1.771 * 
Relative income .027   -.034  -.477  
Mean village income -.005   -.002  -.406 *** 
Distance to market -.007   -.027*  -.145  
ROSCA -.092   .123* -.406  
ROSCA*Bidding .200**  -.206** -.029  
South .047   -.000  2.114 ** 
Constant .960***  1.012*** 3.255  
Number of clusters 181   181  181  
      
           
 
Note: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 
1% level. We conducted robust regressions, and adjusted standard errors for correlations 
within individuals.  
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Table 5: Correlation between time preferences parameters and demographic 
variables under quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 
1% level. We conducted robust regressions, and adjusted standard errors for correlations 
within individuals.  
 
 
Demographic 
variables for  δ 
Demographic 
variables for β 
δ (Discount rate) .280  .103  
β (Present bias) .898*** .720** 
Age -.002* .003  
Gender (1=male) -.087** .048  
Education .005  -.005  
Acquaintance ratio -.022  -.131  
Trusted agent -.045  .065  
Farm/livestock -.028* .059  
Fishery -.112*** .059  
Trade -.059  -.036  
Business .228  -.126  
Government officer -.062** -.018  
Relative income .067** -.012  
Mean village income -.004** .009* 
Distance to market .010  .001  
ROSCA -.121** .147* 
ROSCA*Bidding .227** -.265** 
Log (savings) -.001  .007  
Exp/income ratio .002  -.001  
South -.014  -.022  
Clusers 181  181  
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Figure 1. Locations of Experimental Sites 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1:  Variable definitions 
 
Variable name Description 
Age Age of the subject 
Gender  Gender of the subject, 1=male 
Education Number of years the subject attended school 
Acquaintance ratio 
Number of other subjects the subject knows by name divided by the total number  
of subjects in the session 
Farm/livestock Subject's main occupation is farming or raising livestock 
Fishery Subject's main occupation is fishing 
Trade Subject's main occupation is trading 
Business The subject is engaged in household business 
Government officer The subject works for a local government 
Relative income Subject's household income divided by the mean household income of the village 
Mean village income Mean household income of the village (million dong) 
Gini coefficient  Gini coefficient of the income among 25 households surveyed in 2002 
Distance to market  Distance to the nearest local market (km) 
ROSCA 1=the member of ROSCA, 0=otherwise 
ROSCA*Bidding 1=the member of Bidding ROSCA, 0=otherwise 
Binary (South) 1= field experiment in the South (non-student subjects) 
Trusted agent The subject is a trusted agent of delayed delivery of money  
Log (savings) 
 
Logged savings. Savings is measured as the total value of savings in cash, gold and  
savings accounts. 
Exp/income ratio Household expenditure divided by household income per year 
 
